The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre says it is highly likely that, between now and 2028, AI-powered malware will have been used in a ransomware attack on UK critical national infrastructure (CNI). The judgement comes in the NCSC’s Annual Review 2026, published on 3 November and covering 1 September 2025 to 31 August 2026. It is a forecast, not a reported incident: we found no such attack described in the review as of 4 November 2026.
Context
The review sets the AI judgement inside a broader threat picture. The NCSC calls China’s activity “the most sophisticated and sustained cyber challenge” facing the UK, and says Russia “currently represents the most audacious cyber threat”. For Russia, it cites a July 2026 joint advisory, issued with 18 international partners, on FSB Centre 16 actors exploiting vulnerable routers to target CNI networks worldwide. It also says the UK and EU member states formally attributed a December 2025 attack on Poland’s energy grid to the same FSB unit. The NCSC says that attack, had it succeeded, could have caused 500,000 citizens to lose electricity.
On AI, the NCSC is careful. It says AI will highly likely speed up and scale existing attack methods rather than run attacks end to end, and that human operators remain essential. It also says that AI-assisted vulnerability discovery will highly likely give attackers more opportunity to hit systems before patching, that China highly likely has the intent and is best positioned to use AI against CNI, and that open source AI tools built for researchers are likely to be repurposed by criminals.
The incident numbers frame the load. The NCSC’s incident team received 1,831 reports in the year, 337 needed its support, and 80 were classed as nationally significant. Its Early Warning service notified 8,500 organisations of suspected compromise. Most successful compromises still relied on familiar methods: known vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems, stolen credentials and social engineering.
What it means for the sectors
For operators of essential services, our assessment is that the practical message is about patch speed and visibility, not exotic AI malware. The NCSC says organisations with ageing technology, limited visibility of their estates and slow remediation will find resilience harder as vulnerabilities become easier to find and exploit at scale. It also points to the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill, which it says will bring new sectors into scope and add national security powers to respond to crises.
The review’s own 2028 scenario, which it says is not a prediction, adds that wider AI capability makes attribution harder and increases the potential for compromise that affects the physical world.
Recommended actions
These are our recommendations, drawn from the review’s themes:
- Shorten patch cycles for internet-facing systems (our addition: start with anything on the CISA KEV list).
- Replace passwords with passkeys where possible, which the review recommends to reduce stolen-credential risk.
- Map dependencies: know the systems, suppliers and technologies your critical services rely on.
- Rehearse recovery: test restoring services, not only preventing intrusion.
- Brief the board: the NCSC says boards should seek evidence of measurable preparedness and recovery capability.