Play
CISA/FBI/ACSC and most vendors describe Play as a closed, private group that controls negotiations directly, per the group's own leak-site statement. A single November 2023 Adlumin report argued it had shifted toward a RaaS/affiliate model — not independently corroborated since. Operating model is unresolved. · Financial — double extortion
Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTPs)
- Initial access via purchased valid accounts; FortiOS (CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812); ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040/41082)
- Since June 2025: SimpleHelp RMM chain (CVE-2024-57727/57726/57728) via initial-access brokers
- AdFind, Grixba, BloodHound for recon; GMER/IOBit/PowerTool to blind security tools
- Hybrid AES-RSA encryption with intermittent (every-other-chunk) encryption, .PLAY extension; binary recompiled per attack
- ESXi variant (added June 2025): AES-256, powers off VMs before encrypting datastores
- Distinctive extortion: no ransom amount or negotiation portal in the note — victims emailed to a gmx.de/web.de address
Known Targets
Analyst Notes
Still active through October 2026; no confirmed arrest, sanction, or indictment specifically naming Play identified. Symantec reported Play-affiliated actors (as Balloonfly) used CVE-2025-29824 via a compromised Cisco ASA, deploying Grixba but no ransomware payload in that intrusion. Microsoft's unrelated 'Storm-2460' cluster used the same CVE to deliver the PipeMagic backdoor; Symantec explicitly distinguishes Storm-2460 from the Play intrusion it analyzed, though at least one secondary report conflates the two — treat 'Storm-2460 = Play' as unconfirmed.
Also Known As