TeamPCP

Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTPs)

• GitHub Actions OIDC token abuse via pull_request_target workflow misconfiguration
• Build cache poisoning for trusted npm package publication under legitimate maintainer identity
• Mini Shai-Hulud self-propagating npm worm targeting JavaScript ecosystem
• Credential sweep covering 130 file paths (SSH keys, cloud credentials, API tokens, kubeconfigs)
• Open-source worm publication and BreachForums contest to enable copycat campaigns
• Python backdoor polling GitHub repository for signed C2 messages
• Extortion demands post-compromise
• Miasma self-replicating supply chain worm — derived from Mini Shai-Hulud, released as open-source by TeamPCP (UNC6780) on BreachForums
• Targeting of GitHub repositories via retained developer credentials from the May 2026 TeamPCP compromise
• Compromise of core Azure SDK repositories including durabletask, Azure Functions, and AI integration packages
• Credential theft from compromised developer environments for subsequent repository access
• Worm propagation across connected repository ecosystems without requiring direct exploitation

Known Targets

Analyst Notes

Responsible for the Mini Shai-Hulud npm supply chain campaign, May 2026 -- one of the most consequential developer supply chain attacks on record. The attack chain (GitHub Actions misconfiguration → build cache poisoning → OIDC token extraction → trusted npm publication) required no stolen credentials. CISA issued three CVEs with expedited remediation deadlines. The open-sourcing of the worm under MIT licence, combined with a $1,000 BreachForums contest for copycat attacks, transforms this from a targeted campaign into proliferating infrastructure. Derivative campaigns targeting PyPI, Go modules, and NuGet are a material near-term risk. Additional reporting: The Miasma variant emerged after TeamPCP (UNC6780) publicly released the Mini Shai-Hulud worm source code on BreachForums in mid-May 2026, inviting copycat use. The June 2026 compromise of 73 Microsoft GitHub repositories — including core Azure SDK components — represents the proliferation risk that open-sourcing the worm created. The re-compromise of the durabletask repository (also affected in May) indicates Microsoft did not fully rotate credentials from the initial breach. Operating semi-independently of the original TeamPCP operation; the worm's open-source status means attribution to a specific actor becomes increasingly difficult as derivative campaigns multiply across PyPI, Go modules, and NuGet ecosystems.

Also Known As

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques